

Evaluation and Validation

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(slides are based on


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TU Dortmund, Informatik 12

Germany

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Structure of this course



Numbers denote sequence of chapters

How to evaluate designs according to multiple criteria?

Many different criteria are relevant for evaluating designs:

- average & worst case delay
- power/energy consumption
- thermal behavior
- reliability, safety, security
- cost, size
- weight, numerical precision
- EMC characteristics
- radiation hardness, environmental friendliness, ..



How to compare different designs?
(Some designs are “better” than others)


Impact of shrinking feature sizes

- Reduced reliability due to smaller patterns within semiconductor chips [ITRS, 2009]
- Transient & permanent faults

Types of faults: Example: Electro-migration

Example : metal migration @ Pentium 4

www.jrwhipple.com/computer_hangs.html



- Rate of faults expected to increase such that designs need to become fault-tolerant

Terms

- “A **service failure**, often abbreviated here to **failure**, is an event that occurs when the delivered service of a system deviates from the correct service.”
- “The definition of an **error** is the part of the total state of the system that may lead to its subsequent service failure”.
- “The adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error is called a **fault**. Faults can be internal or external of a system.”

Example:

- Transient **fault** flipping a bit in memory.
- After this bit flip, the memory cell will be in **error**.
- **Failure**: if the system service is affected by this error.

We will consider **failure** rates & **fault** models.

[Laprie et al., 1992, 2004]

Recent Crash: Hitomi

Hitomi (Japanese satellite)

<https://spaceflightnow.com/2016/04/18/>

- Crashed in the space near Earth on 26, March, 2016
- A series of transient faults led to a certain error
- The problem started when the satellite's inertial reference unit detected Hitomi was rotating around its Z-axis at 21.7 degrees per hour.
- The spacecraft was actually stable at the time.
- The satellite's attitude control system commanded Hitomi's reaction wheels, rapidly-spinning devices which control the pointing of the spacecraft with momentum, to counteract the spin. The action caused the satellite to rotate in the opposite direction as the faulty inertial reference unit indicated,

Recent Crash: ExoMars Schiaparelli

ExoMars Schiaparelli

- Crashed on Mars on 19, October, 2016 while landing
- As Schiaparelli descended under its parachute, its radar Doppler altimeter functioned correctly.
- However, saturation – maximum measurement – of the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) had occurred shortly after the parachute deployment.
- The IMU measures the rotation rates of the vehicle.
- The erroneous information generated an estimated altitude that was negative – that is, below ground level.
- This in turn triggered a premature release of the parachute and the backshell, a brief firing of the braking thrusters and finally activation of the on-ground systems as if Schiaparelli had already landed.
- In reality, the vehicle was still at an altitude of around 3.7 km.

http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Science/ExoMars/Schiaparelli_landing_investigation_makes_progress

Dependability

Aspects of dependability:

- Safety
- Security
- Confidentiality
- Reliability

Def.: A system is **resilient** if internal or external changes of the assumptions made at design time will change the overall user experience only in a limited way.

Safety analysis: standards possibly to be met

- ISO 9001
- IEC 61508
 - part 1: safety of technical systems in general
 - part 2: electrical/programmable systems
 - part3: software requirements
 - Safety integrity levels (SIL) & failure rates per hour (FIT): $10^{-5}..10^{-6}$ for SIL-1, $10^{-6}..10^{-7}$ for SIL-2, $10^{-7}..10^{-8}$ for SIL-3, $10^{-8}..10^{-9}$ for SIL-4.
 - SIL-4 difficult to achieve, typically requires redundancy
 - specific extensions for certain application areas
- MISRA-C: standard for using C in automotive industry
- IEC 62279, CENELEC 50128: rail-based transportation
- DO-178B: airborne systems
- ...

Safety cases

In such cases, an independent authority has to be convinced that certain technical equipment is indeed safe.


One of the commonly requested properties of technical systems is that no single failing component should potentially cause a catastrophe.

Reliability: $f(t)$, $F(t)$

- Let T : time until first failure (random variable)
- Let $f(t)$ be the density function of T

Example: Exponential distribution

$$f(t) = \lambda e^{-\lambda t}$$




- $F(t)$ = probability of the system being faulty at time t :

$$F(t) = \Pr(T \leq t) \qquad F(t) = \int_0^t f(x) dx$$

Example: Exponential distribution

$$F(t) = \int_0^t \lambda e^{-\lambda x} dx = -[e^{-\lambda x}]_0^t = 1 - e^{-\lambda t}$$



Reliability: $R(t)$

- **Reliability** $R(t)$ = probability that the time until the first failure is larger than some time t :


$$R(t) = \Pr(T > t), \quad t \geq 0 \quad R(t) = \int_t^{\infty} f(x) dx$$

$$F(t) + R(t) = \int_0^t f(x) dx + \int_t^{\infty} f(x) dx = 1$$

$$R(t) = 1 - F(t) \quad f(t) = -\frac{dR(t)}{dt}$$

Example: Exponential distribution

$$R(t) = e^{-\lambda t}$$




Failure rate

The failure rate at time t is the probability of the system failing between time t and time $t+\Delta t$:

$$\lambda(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{\Pr(t < T \leq t + \Delta t \mid T > t)}{\Delta t} = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{F(t + \Delta t) - F(t)}{\Delta t R(t)} = \frac{f(t)}{R(t)}$$

Conditional probability ("provided that the system works at t ");

$$\Pr(A|B) = \Pr(AB) / \Pr(B)$$



For exponential distribution:

$$\frac{f(t)}{R(t)} = \frac{\lambda e^{-\lambda t}}{e^{-\lambda t}} = \lambda$$

FIT = expected number of failures in 10^9 hrs.

FIT & “ 10^{-9} ” (per hour)

“ 10^{-9} ”: For many systems, probability of a catastrophe has to be less than 10^{-9} per hour \equiv one case per 100,000 systems for 10,000 hours.

FIT: failure-in-time unit for failure rate

1 FIT: rate of 10^{-9} failures per hour

MTTF = $E\{T\}$, the *statistical mean value* of T

$$\text{MTTF} = E\{T\} = \int_0^{\infty} t \cdot f(t) dt$$

According to the definition of the statistical mean value

Example: Exponential distribution

$$\text{MTTF}_{\text{exp}} = \int_0^{\infty} t \cdot \lambda e^{-\lambda t} dt = -\cancel{\left[t \cdot e^{-\lambda t} \right]_0^{\infty}} + \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\lambda t} dt$$

$$\int u \cdot v' = u \cdot v - \int u' \cdot v$$

$$\text{MTTF}_{\text{exp}} = -\frac{1}{\lambda} \left[e^{-\lambda t} \right]_0^{\infty} = -\frac{1}{\lambda} [0 - 1] = \frac{1}{\lambda}$$

MTTF is the reciprocal value of failure rate.


MTTF, MTTR and MTBF

MTTR = mean time to repair

(average over repair times using distribution $M(d)$)

MTBF* = mean time between failures = MTTF + MTTR

Ignoring the statistical nature of failures ...



$$\text{Availability } A = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} A(t) = \frac{\text{MTTF}}{\text{MTBF}}$$


* Mixed up with MTTF, if starting in operational state is implicitly assumed

Actual failure rates

Failure rates derived from experiments at higher temperatures.

Example: failure rates less than 100 FIT for the first 20 years (175,300 hrs) of life at 150° C @ TriQuint (GaAs)

[www.triquint.com/company/quality/faqs/faq_11.cfm]



Target: Failures rates of systems ≤ 1 FIT

Reality: Failures rates of circuits ≤ 100 FIT

☞ redundancy is required to make a system more reliable than its components

∃ non-constant failure rates!

Fault tree Analysis (FTA)

Damages are resulting from hazards/risks.


For every damage there is a severity and a probability.

Several techniques for analyzing risks.

- FTA is a top-down method of analyzing risks. Analysis starts with possible damage, tries to come up with possible scenarios that lead to that damage.
- FTA typically uses a graphical representation of possible damages, including symbols for AND- and OR-gates.
- OR-gates are used if a single event could result in a hazard.
- AND-gates are used when several events or conditions are required for that hazard to exist.



Example



Limitations

The simple AND- and OR-gates cannot model all situations.

For example, their modeling power is exceeded if shared resources of some limited amount (like energy or storage locations) exist.


Markov models may have to be used to cover such cases.

Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)

- FMEA starts at the components and tries to estimate their reliability. The first step is to create a table containing components, possible faults, probability of faults and consequences on the system behavior.

<i>Component</i>	<i>Failure</i>	<i>Consequences</i>	<i>Probability</i>	<i>Critical?</i>
...
Processor	metal migration	no service	10^{-7} /h	yes
...

- Using this information, the reliability of the system is computed from the reliability of its parts (corresponding to a bottom-up analysis).



Safety cases

Both approaches may be used in “safety cases”.

In such cases, an independent authority has to be convinced that certain technical equipment is indeed safe.

One of the commonly requested properties of technical systems is that no single failing component should potentially cause a catastrophe.

Dependability requirements

Allowed failures may be in the order of 1 failure per 10^9 h.

~ 1000 times less than typical failure rates of chips.

☞ For safety-critical systems, the system as a whole must be more dependable than any of its parts.


☞ fault-tolerance mechanisms must be used.

Low acceptable failure rate → systems not 100% testable.

☞ Safety must be shown by a combination of testing and reasoning. Abstraction must be used to make the system explainable using a hierarchical set of behavioral models. Design faults and human failures must be taken into account.

Kopetz 's 12 design principles (1-3)




1. Safety considerations may have to be used as the important part of the specification, driving the entire design process.
2. Precise specifications of design hypotheses must be made right at the beginning. These include expected failures and their probability.
3. Fault containment regions (FCRs) must be considered. Faults in one FCR should not affect other FCRs.



Safety-critical & non-safety critical electronics

Kopetz 's 12 design principles (4-6)

4. A consistent notion of time and state must be established. Otherwise, it will be impossible to differentiate between original and follow-up errors.
5. Well-defined interfaces have to hide the internals of components.
6. It must be ensured that components fail independently.



2 independent
brake hose
systems

Kopetz 's 12 design principles (7-9)

7. Components should consider themselves to be correct unless two or more other components pretend the contrary to be true (principle of self-confidence).
8. Fault tolerance mechanisms must be designed such that they do not create any additional difficulty in explaining the behavior of the system. Fault tolerance mechanisms should be decoupled from the regular function.
9. The system must be designed for diagnosis. For example, it has to be possible to identifying existing (but masked) errors.



one of the systems
sufficient for braking




Kopetz 's 12 design principles (10-12)

10. The man-machine interface must be intuitive and forgiving. Safety should be maintained despite mistakes made by humans.



airbag

11. Every anomaly should be recorded. These anomalies may be unobservable at the regular interface level. Recording to involve internal effects, otherwise they may be masked by fault-tolerance mechanisms.



12. Provide a never-give up strategy. ES may have to provide uninterrupted service. Going offline is unacceptable.



Simulations

- Simulations try to imitate the behavior of the real system on a (typically digital) computer.
- Simulation of the functional behavior requires executable models.
- Simulations can be performed at various levels.
- Some non-functional properties (e.g. temperatures, EMC) can also be simulated.
- Simulations can be used to **evaluate** and to **validate** a design

Validating functional behavior by simulation

Various levels of abstractions used for simulations:

- High-level of abstraction: fast, but sometimes not accurate
- Lower level of abstraction: slow and typically accurate
- Choosing a level is always a compromise

Simulations: Limitations

- Typically slower than the actual design.
 - ☞ **Violations of timing constraints** likely if simulator is connected to the actual environment
- Simulations in the real environment may be **dangerous**
- There may be huge amounts of data and it may be impossible to simulate enough data in the available time.
- Most actual systems are too complex to allow simulating all possible cases (inputs).
Simulations can help finding errors in designs, but they **cannot guarantee the absence of errors.**



Rapid prototyping/Emulation

- Prototype: Embedded system that can be generated quickly and behaves very similar to the final product.
- May be larger, more power consuming and have other properties that can be accepted in the validation phase
- Can be built, for example, using FPGAs.

Example:
Quickturn Cobalt
System (1997),
~0.5M\$ for
500kgate entry
level system



Source & ©: <http://www.eedesign.com/editorial/1997/toolsandtech9703.html>

Emulation

- Simulations: based on models, which are approximations of real systems.
- In general: \exists difference between real system and model.
- Reduce gap by implementing parts of SUD more precisely!

Definition: Emulation is the process of executing a model of the SUD where at least one component is **not** represented by simulation on some kind of host computer.

“Bridging the credibility gap is not the only reason for a growing interest in emulation—the above definition of an emulation model remains valid when turned around— an emulation model is one where part of the real system is replaced by a model. Using emulation models to test control systems under realistic conditions, by replacing the “real system“ with a model, is proving to be of considerable interest ... [McGregor, 2002]

Formal verification

- Formal verification = formally proving a system correct, using the language of mathematics.
- Formal model required. Obtaining this cannot be automated.
- Model available → try to prove properties.
- Even a formally verified system can fail (e.g. if assumptions are not met).
- Classification by the type of logics.



Ideally: Formally verified tools transforming specifications into implementations (“*correctness by construction*”).

In practice: Non-verified tools and manual design steps → validation of each and every design required

Unfortunately has to be done at intermediate steps and not just for the final design → Major effort required.

Model checking

Aims at the verification of finite state systems.

Analyzes the state space of the system.

Verification using this approach requires three stages:

- generation of a model of the system to be verified,
- definition of the properties expected, and
- model checking (the actual verification step).

ACM Turing award 2008 granted for basic work on model checking



Edmund M. Clarke, CMU, Pittsburgh



E. Allen Emerson, U. Texas at Austin



Joseph Sifakis, VERIMAG, Grenoble

Summary

Evaluation and Validation:

- Reliability
 - Definitions
 - Failure rates
 - MTBF, MTTF, MTTR
 - Fault tree analysis, FMEA
 - Kopetz' 12 principles
- Simulation, Emulation
- Formal verification